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Why Humanitarianism Needs a Pacifist Ethos 
Abstract 
Debates concerning the relationship between humanitarianism and the use of force are 
by no means a new phenomenon, yet humanitarian rationales for waging war have 
become more and more commonplace over recent decades. The commitment to 
humanitarian intervention, in particular, raises deep theoretical and practical questions 
about the foundational principle of political neutrality espoused by many humanitarian 
aid organisations. In this paper I will provide an overview of the literature on the 
relationship between humanitarianism and the use of force before advancing the 
argument that a genuine humanitarianism must necessarily be premised upon a pacifist 
ethos. A pacifist ethos, in this context, is presented as a commitment to non-violence 
and anti-war activism even while recognising the limits of such an aspiration. Such an 
understanding of pacifism in practice, inspired in part by realist ethics, allows 
humanitarian actors to take strong, principled, and sustained stands in support of 
universal values of peace and human well-being without losing sight of the material 
challenges posed by the very real violence of the arenas in which they operate.  
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Responsibility to Protect. 
Introduction 
The fundamental principles of humanity, neutrality, and independence espoused by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are viewed by many as being essential 
touchstones for the maintenance of a humanitarian agenda. Yet while any organisation that 
premises its work on humanitarianism must necessarily at least pay lip service to aiding 
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“humanity” as its object, there remains contention over the importance of the principle of 
neutrality and the associated expectation of independence both in theoretical and practical 
domains. This controversial principle, which is aimed at maintaining a gap between the 
politics of states and the provision of basic human needs to those affected by conflict, has 
become increasingly strained as states have adopted humanitarian language to support both 
their decisions to wage war and their conduct within war. The problematic consequences of 
this conflation of humanitarian action and the human rights movement became the subject of 
much critical analysis and debate in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as humanitarian 
rationales for waging war became more and more commonplace, placing a reformist political 
agenda at the centre of the work of many humanitarian NGOs. Thus, as David Chandler  
argues, while “humanitarian aid started out as an expression of empathy with common 
humanity, it has been transformed through the discourse of human rights into a lever for 
strategic aims drawn up and acted upon by external agencies.”1 In the years that have 
followed, the use of force for humanitarian purposes has become more and more 
controversial, particularly due to the disastrous consequences of both action and inaction in 
cases such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. It is in this context that this paper aims to renew the 
call for an abandonment of the temptations of military force on the part of humanitarian 
NGOs, arguing instead for the commitment to a pacifist ethos to ensure that the good name 
and value of humanitarian work is not further eroded and to give a sustained anti-war voice to 
those same organisations. 
 
In approaching this problem, this paper seeks to address two core questions: first, why is the 
principle of political neutrality important to humanitarian ethics, and how has it been side-
                                                 
1 David Chandler, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a 
New Humanitarian Agenda,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2001), p. 700. 
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lined over recent decades?; and, second, in what ways might a renewed emphasis on a 
pacifist ethos be of benefit to the future prospects of humanitarianism, in both theory and 
practice? I will answer each of these questions in turn, starting with an overview of the 
debates around humanitarian neutrality. I will then look at claims that the loss of neutrality 
and independence, through the collision of the post-Cold War human rights and humanitarian 
agendas, has poisoned the well of humanitarianism in practice, pushing away from the 
normative commitment to universal humanity, handing too much influence to state interests 
and weakening the trust that might otherwise have accrued to humanitarian NGOs. This 
section will particularly focus on the ways in which states have manipulated international 
humanitarian law and humanitarian intervention in order to legitimise and sustain their 
deployment of force in various places around the globe. The final part will then suggest that 
the decay of the humanitarian ideal and the challenges this has presented for those pursuing 
humanitarian goals can be arrested only by continued efforts to adhere to the principle of 
neutrality, which in turn necessitates the embrace of a pacifist ethos. This, I will argue, is the 
only way to prevent the universal aspirations of humanitarianism from collapsing into the 
violently-pursued interests and aspirations of the great powers in international politics.  
 
The Debate over Humanitarianism and Political Neutrality 
The most widely recognised principles that guide the provision of humanitarian aid are 
humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. The principles, which were first clearly 
enunciated by the ICRC in 1965, have since been incorporated into a UN General Assembly 
Resolution and remain central to the multi-agency Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality 
and Accountability (CHS), which represents a set of principles to be applied across a range of 
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humanitarian NGOs.2 According to the influential commentary written by former head of the 
ICRC, Jean Pictet, the principles provide a “firm and healthy doctrinal foundation” for the 
work of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies that is universal, permanent, and essential 
to the existence of the organization.3 Yet while large and influential organisations like the 
ICRC and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) continue to adhere to their understanding of 
political neutrality as strictly as possible, many other groups have contested this principle and 
have sought to engage politically as a part of their humanitarian action, particularly since the 
end of the Cold War. It is for this reason that the CHS contains the rider that “[s]ome 
organisations, while committed to giving impartial assistance and not taking sides in 
hostilities, do not consider that the principle of neutrality precludes undertaking advocacy on 
issues related to accountability and justice.”4 There is, therefore, a recognised division 
between “traditional” or “Dunatist” humanitarian organisations and those that are often 
referred to in terms of a “new humanitarianism.”5 In order to come to terms with the 
                                                 
2 United Nations General Assembly, UNGA Resolution A/RES/46/182 (19 December 1991), 
available: <https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm> (accessed 21 August 2018); 
The Sphere Project, “The Core Humanitarian Standard: Analysis and Comparison,”  (2015), 
available: 
<http://resources.spherehandbook.org/resources/Sphere_Core_Standards_and_CHS.pdf?string=
~sh_resources/resources/Sphere_Core_Standards_and_CHS.pdf > (accessed 21 August 2018). 
3 Jean Pictet, “The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary,” (1979), available: 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/fundamental-principles-commentary-
010179.htm> (accessed 21 August 2018). 
4 The Sphere Project, op cit. 
5 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, 
2nd edition (London: Zed Books, 2014), Chapter 4; Larry Minear, The Humanitarian 
Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002), p. 80; Stuart 
Gordon and Antonio Donini, “Romancing Principles and Human Rights: Are Humanitarian 




significance of this divide, it is vital to understand the theoretical (or deontological) and 
practical (or consequential) reasons underpinning the humanitarian commitment to political 
neutrality and its relation to the principle of humanity that stands at the heart of humanitarian 
aid provision.  
 
The principle of humanity necessarily lies at the centre of humanitarian values and is vital to 
any understanding of the commitment to neutrality, for reasons that are often under-specified 
or quickly dismissed in the literature on humanitarian aid.6 In its simplest terms, the 
commitment to save human lives and the refusal to prioritise the lives of some human beings 
above others on any grounds stands as the very basis of humanitarianism itself. Thus, from 
the ICRC perspective, the refusal to discriminate on the grounds of “nationality, race, 
religious beliefs, class or political opinions” is seen as an “imperative element of humanity” 
reflected in founder Henry Dunant’s call to “care for the enemy wounded as friends.”7 This 
was necessary, as much for Dunant as for subsequent adherents to the humanitarian 
principles, precisely because the state and its attendant organisations had proved incapable of 
doing so itself, leaving combatants in war (and, later, civilians affected by war) without 
adequate basic standards of care. Thus, as Larissa Fast has argued, “humanity, with its 
associated practices, can and must serve as an orienting principle for humanitarianism” even 
as we recognise its “interlocking, inherent tensions... rooted in its ideal vision and its 
imperfect manifestations.”8  
 
The inherent tension of the concept of humanity that is central to the argument advanced 
                                                 
6 Larissa Fast, “Unpacking the Principle of Humanity: Tensions and Implications,” International 
Review of the Red Cross Vol. 97, No. 897-898 (2015). 
7 Pictet, ibid, p. 24. 
8 Fast, ibid. 
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below is that it cannot be adequately manifested in a highly politicized, statist form, an issue 
addressed with devastating clarity in Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political.9 For Schmitt, 
the concern was with the use by states of the term ‘humanity’, which he argued could not 
correspond to any real political grouping, particularly in the brutally divided context of inter-
state war.10 Humanity, as a universal concept, necessarily transcends the politics of 
international relations; either that, or it is something other than a logically and morally 
coherent humanitarianism. The implication of this, and the reason for adherence to the 
principle of neutrality, is that a genuine humanitarianism can only be pursued if political 
friends and enemies alike are all treated equally as human beings. This was precisely what 
Dunant sought to achieve: a humanitarianism that was true to its universalism by refusing to 
be drawn into taking sides (other than being on the side of “humanity”) in violent political 
conflict. This does not mean a complete detachment from politics. As Pictet recognised, the 
Red Cross, placed in situations of extreme political crisis, “is in politics up to its neck”, but 
“must reckon with politics without becoming a part of it.”11There is a viable politics of 
humanitarianism, as I will argue further below, but it cannot be advanced in alliance with the 
military power of the state. The pursuit of a truly universal sense of humanity and the 
associated principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence that lie behind the work of 
the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies is, therefore, a much more theoretically viable 
humanitarianism than that offered by the state or in alliance with the state or a particular 
political ideology. This deontological reasoning for adherence to  principles of neutrality and 
independence remains relevant to contemporary dilemmas of humanitarian action, yet it is 
generally viewed as being secondary to the practical or consequential reasons for the 
                                                 
9 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. Tracy Strong, Translated from Der Begriff des 
Politischen [2nd Ed. 1934], (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1996). 
10 Ibid. 





Debates over the material consequences of adopting and adhering to the principle of 
neutrality are hotly contested in both the scholarly literature and amongst aid agencies. In 
response to criticisms of the ICRC’s adherence to neutrality, there has been a tendency to 
stress that “[r]emaining neutral in conflict is not a moral position but simply the most 
effective basis found to date on which to negotiate access to people in need of humanitarian 
assistance, wherever they are.”12 From this “traditional” perspective, neutrality is necessary 
“in order to enjoy the confidence of all” parties to a conflict.13 As Pictet puts it, “[c]onfidence 
is vital to the Red Cross; without confidence it would no longer be entrusted with work of 
public utility and it would receive no more donations.” Or, as Fiona Terry argues, 
“humanitarian action must remain independent and strive for as neutral an image as possible 
if it is to reach those in need on all sides of a conflict.”14 From this point of view, confidence 
of the warring parties is essential for the presence of humanitarian aid that can provide relief 
for the suffering in an impartial, non-discriminatory manner. Terry illustrates the importance 
of this in her overview of the performance of the ICRC in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards, 
concluding that humanitarianism should be “about helping those who are hurt by war, 
whoever they are, and nothing else. But that view can only be promoted if humanitarian 
                                                 
12 Fiona Terry, “The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the 
Neutrality of Humanitarian Action,” International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 93, No. 881 
(2011), p. 187. See also Marion Harroff-Tavel, “Neutrality and Impartiality: The Importance of 
these Principles for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Difficulties 
Involved in Applying Them”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 273 (1989), p. 
540; Stuart Gordon and Antonio Donini, op cit, pp. 93-94. 
13 Pictet, op cit, p. 35; Mary B. Anderson, “To Work, or Not to Work, in ‘Tainted’ Circumstances: 
Difficult Choices for Humanitarians,” Social Research Vol. 74, No. 1 (2007). 
14 Terry, “The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan”, op cit, p. 187. 
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action is and remains neutral and independent of all extraneous influences.”15 Strong 
consequential arguments in favour of preserving neutrality can also be found in MSF’s 
International Activity Reports, one of which claims that: 
attempts to push the humanitarian actor to one ‘side’ abrogate the basic right of people in 
need to get assistance regardless of their political or other affiliation. Moreover, being 
identified with a belligerent can have devastating consequences in terms of security and 
access to victims in volatile contexts.16 
The challenge of political neutrality has been an ever-present one for humanitarian 
organisations, including the Red Cross,17 yet there is a strong perception that the post-Cold 
War era represented a high point in the politicisation of humanitarian values and that this was 
ultimately expressed through the normalisation of military humanitarianism and state 
domination of the humanitarian agenda from the 1990s onward. The primary cause of the 
emergent state domination of humanitarianism in the 1990s was, according to critics, the 
collapsing of the proactive, transformative human rights agenda into the more relief-focused 
humanitarian agenda.18 No longer was it sufficient to treat the worst symptoms of military 
conflict, it was now incumbent on the human rights/humanitarian community (comprised of 
states and NGOs working together) to address “root causes” of conflict, most often through 
economic development and democratisation but also, where necessary, the application of 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 188. 
16 Medecins Sans Frontieres, “Not So Benign: When Lofty Political Goals Have Bad Humanitarian 
Consequences: International Activity Report” (2003), available:  
<http://www.msf.org/en/article/not-so-benign-when-lofty-political-goals-have-bad-
humanitarian-consequences> (accessed 13 November 2017) . 
17 Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, “Is Neutral Humanitarianism Dead? Red Cross Neutrality: Walking 
the Tightrope of Neutral Humanitarianism,” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 31, no. 4 (2009). 
18 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2003); Chandler, op cit. 
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military force. It was at this stage, David Rieff argues, that “the notion of humanitarianism-
against-politics” was abandoned in favour of “the politics of humanitarianism”, leading to a 
situation where “many of the most important mainline agencies, notably Oxfam, turned to 
what they called advocacy — that is, lobbying governments and the UN for funds, but also 
for political commitments and, as the decade progressed, military action.”19 Rieff is 
particularly critical of figures such as Michael Ignatieff, whose “revolution of moral concern” 
mirrored the post-Cold War theoretical excesses of Fukuyama in failing to recognise or 
accept the dangers and limitations of this approach.20 Through this discursive combination, 
the humanitarian agenda came to be associated more with expansive ideals of justice and 
accountability, well beyond the tradition of relief of suffering and much more amenable to 
manipulation for the purpose of advancing state interests. Addressing this transformation, 
Michael Barnett claims that “whereas at the beginning of the [1990s] aid agencies tried to 
recruit states for their cause, by the beginning of the next decade they had discovered that 
states had already co-opted humanitarianism for their interests.”21 This “instrumentalization 
of aid”, as Fiona Terry argues, “tarnished the image of ‘humanitarian’ assistance and turned it 
into a weapon of war.”22 
 
Thus the gravest danger to the traditional humanitarian agenda came from the emergent “new 
                                                 
19 Rieff, ibid, p. 26. 
20 Ibid, 10-12; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: The Free Press, 
1992). 
21 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, 1 ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011), p.172. 
22 Terry, “The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan”, p. 175. 
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interventionists”23 and “new humanitarians”24 in the post-Cold War era. Through the highs 
and lows of purportedly humanitarian military interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, 
alongside the failure to militarily respond to the Rwandan genocide, the refrain “we must do 
something!” had become common currency by the end of the decade, representing the 
normalisation of a more militarised humanitarianism. Kofi Annan’s oft-quoted question, 
posed in the wake of NATO’s controversial Kosovo intervention, represents an example of 
this implicit demand for the militarisation of humanitarianism: “if humanitarian intervention 
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of 
our common humanity?”25 
 
The most systematic and influential response to this question came in the form of the 
Responsibility to Protect,26 which attempts to frame the moral and legal norms around 
legitimate military intervention for human protection purposes. This re-framing of debates 
around humanitarian intervention has served only to further the “common sense” of using 
force for humanitarian purposes, intensifying the potential challenges faced by humanitarian 
NGOs who find themselves in the middle of crises that give rise to debates over intervention, 
as well as facing the expectation that they will work to alleviate the suffering caused by the 
interventions themselves. In the heat of such politically intense situations, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the humanitarian insistence on impartiality and neutrality can lead to 
                                                 
23 Stephen John Stedman, “The New Interventionists,” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc, 
1993). 
24 Chandler, op cit., p. 678. 
25 See, for example, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The 
Responsibility to Protect,” (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre for ICISS, 




accusations of naïvety, complicity, and moral delinquency.27 
It was these concerns about the failure of humanitarianism to address the “root causes” of 
suffering that drove the more policy-oriented, activist versions of humanitarian aid, as harsh 
lessons were learned about the limits and dilemmas of humanitarianism in Somalia, Bosnia, 
Rwanda, and Kosovo. For Rieff, this trend was most clearly manifested in 1999 with the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo where, he argued, “the battle for an independent 
humanitarianism was probably lost.”28 As Alan Woolfolk summarises it in his insightful 
review of Rieff”s A Bed for the Night:  
 
In their eagerness for “humanitarian military intervention”, humanitarian activists (let 
alone the general public) were tone deaf to the conflation of humanitarianism and human 
rights as well as the confusion of humanitarian and political-military roles. Relief 
workers simply preferred not to acknowledge that they had become “a moral warrant for 
warfare”, while NATO appropriated the rhetoric of human rights, especially the critique 
of state sovereignty employed by Human Rights Watch… Humanitarianism became an 
instrument of foreign policy, not simply for instrumental reasons but because neither 
humanitarians nor politicians could distinguish humanitarian ends from political ends.29 
 
                                                 
27 For an extended discussion of the dilemmas of humanitarianism see Mary B. Anderson, Do No 
Harm: How Aid can Support Peace – Or War. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); 
See also Barry Munslow, "Complex Emergencies: The Institutional Impasse." Third World 
Quarterly Vol. 20, No. 1 (1999): pp. 207-222; S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss, "Political 
interest and humanitarian action", Security Studies Vol. 10, No. 1 (2000), pp. 112-142; Barnett, 
Michael, and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics. 
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
28 Rieff, op cit, p. 197. 
29 Alan Woolfolk, “Review Symposium: David Rieff's a Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis 
an Impossible yet Necessary Ethic of Resistance,” Journal of Human Rights Vol. 2, No. 2 
(2003), p. 251. 
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This conflation of humanitarian values and the political ends of the state has also flowed over 
into the way in which international humanitarian law (IHL) is called upon in the context of 
war. The traditional purpose of IHL, encapsulated primarily in the Geneva Conventions, was 
to restrain the conduct of states in war and reduce the suffering of combatants, prisoners, and 
civilians caught up in violent political conflict. Yet the instrumental use of IHL by states in 
order to discredit and delegitimise their enemies in war is a further indication of the capture 
of humanitarianism by states themselves. The invention and increasing use of the term 
“lawfare” to describe this instrumentalisation of IHL is indicative of the depth of this 
problem. Legal theorists such as Nathaniel Berman and David Kennedy have written 
extensively on this issue, tracing the historical instrumentalisation of just war theory and IHL 
by states.30 The merger of war and humanitarian law forces us to ask questions, as Kennedy 
argues, such as: “What does it mean… to find the humanist vocabulary of international law 
mobilized by the military as a strategic asset? How should we feel when the military ‘legally 
conditions the battlefield’ by informing the public that they are entitled to kill civilians, or 
when our political leadership justifies warfare in the language of human rights?”31 
The response to the latter question, from the point of view of those wary of the politicisation 
and militarisation of humanitarianism, is that we should feel very worried about the 
conflation of warfare, human rights and humanitarianism, not only for the ways in which it 
may extend and legitimise the use of force, but also for how it is impacting upon 
humanitarianism in general. This set of concerns sparked a return to the debate over the value 
                                                 
30 Nathaniel Berman, “Privileging combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of 
War”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2004); David Kennedy, The 
Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004); David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). 
31 Kennedy, Of War and Law, p. 14. 
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of neutrality and independence in the post 9/11 period, as US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
led to increasing concern over the emergence of an “integrated system” of states and 
humanitarian organisations, working together to fight tyranny, provide aid, and ostensibly 
create democratic, human rights-respecting states in the aftermath of war. In their 2005 
International Activity Report, MSF came out strongly against participation in such a system, 
arguing that “the integration of humanitarian action into a system is tantamount to the 
disintegration of its very humanitarian values” and that “[i]mpartiality is vital to continue 
providing medical assistance to vulnerable populations in need.”32 Four years later, MSF 
president Christoph Fournier reiterated the need for independent humanitarian action in a 
speech to NATO, arguing that: 
 
All these other activities [reconstructing the country, promoting democracy, and so on] 
might be worthy of praise. They may be even exactly the sort of activities that NATO 
and NATO countries should be promoting in Afghanistan. But they are goals and 
activities which fall outside of humanitarian ones [and] when humanitarian goals and 
activities are lumped together with this larger, broader, and more future-oriented agenda, 
the direct result is confusion and even contradiction. The indirect result is that civilians in 
conflict do not receive the assistance to which they have a right.33 
The concerns of MSF are reflective of a broader sense that the traditions of humanitarian 
action were/are indeed being eroded through the attachment to the human rights agenda and 
the military power of states. Thus “humanitarian action”, David Chandler argues, “has 
become transformed from relying on empathy with suffering victims and providing 
emergency aid to mobilizing misanthropy and legitimizing the politics of international 
                                                 
32 Medecins Sans Frontieres, “MSF Principles and Identity: The Challenges Ahead,” (2005), 
available: <http://www.msf.org/en/msfs-principles-and-identity-challenges-ahead> (accessed 
November 13, 2017). 
33 quoted in Barnett, Empire of Humanity, op cit, p. 211. 
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condemnation, sanctions, bombing.”34 
The emergence of a group like the White Helmets in Syria is particularly troubling in this 
context. The group, heavily funded by the US, UK and other Western states, claims to adhere 
to principles of impartiality and neutrality.35 Yet there are multiple documented instances of 
group members participating in executions, celebrating the deaths of Syrian government 
fighters, and welcoming the victory of al-Qaeda affiliated groups in parts of Syria since 
2011.36 Further, the association of the White Helmets with a campaign to establish a “no-fly 
zone” over Syria offers a direct example of how the principle of humanitarian neutrality has 
been distorted in practice through association with the use of military force.37 Despite these 
issues, the White Helmets have been lionised in Western media as brave humanitarians 
working in the face of grave threats posed by the Assad regime, and have received a 
nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize and won an Academy Award for a Netflix-produced 
                                                 
34 Chandler, op cit, p.700. 
35 The White Helmets, “Unarmed and Neutral”, available < https://www.whitehelmets.org/en/> 
(accessed 21 August 2018) 
36 The role played by the White Helmets in Syria remains controversial and intensely contested, but 
from the available documented evidence, claims made by the organisation of adherence to 
principles of neutrality and impartiality seem very difficult to sustain. See Tom O’Connor, 
“Syria’s White Helmets, Subject Of Oscar-Winning Film, Caught Dumping Dead Soldiers, Fire 
Volunteer”, Newsweek (2017), available < https://www.newsweek.com/oscar-win-white-
helmets-syria-volunteer-dump-bodies-rebels-628407> (accessed 21 August 2018); Rick Sterling, 
“The ‘White Helmets’ Controversy”, Consortium News (2016), available at 
<https://consortiumnews.com/2018/07/22/the-white-helmets-controversy/> (accessed 21 August 
2018).  
37 The White Helmets, “To the UN Security Council”, available <https://www.whitehelmets.org/en/> 
(accessed 21 August 2018). 
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documentary on their activities.38 Even if we set aside the debate over the merits and 
authenticity of the group, the suggestion that they adhere to principles of impartiality and 
neutrality is impossible to sustain in any coherent manner and speaks again to the dangers of 
politicising humanitarian action. The White Helmets, from this perspective, are representative 
of the dangers of the relentless instrumentalization of humanitarian action in the post-Cold 
War period.  
The overall concern here, borne out by the broader failures in addressing crises in Libya, 
Yemen, and Syria, amongst others, is that the well of humanitarianism has been poisoned by 
the excessively ambitious agendas of politically active humanitarian organisations that 
developed in the “human rights era” of the 1990s. That the temptations of power and promise 
of final and universal achievement of human rights in concert with liberal states proved to be 
ultimately destructive for humanitarian ethics should come as no surprise; there were, after 
all, very good theoretical and practical reasons for espousing humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, and independence as essential principles for humanitarian action. The 
abandonment or watering down of these principles in pursuit of a more thoroughgoing 
universal justice and the promotion of human rights and democracy could only lead to the 
loss, in Rieff’s words, of the “specific moral gravity” of humanitarianism, born from its 
commitment to impartiality and neutrality, in treating the many horrific symptoms of war.39 
As Woolfolk summarises it, “in giving free reign to their spiritual hubris, humanitarians have 
repeated the sins of others before them: they have denied the modesty of their vocation in the 
name of the saving idea of the law (i.e. human rights), accepted the allurements of power, and 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Yasmeen Serhan, “Who Are the White Helmets?” The Atlantic (2016), available 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/09/syria-white-helmets/502073/> (accessed 21 
August 2018). 
39 Rieff, op. cit., p. 297. 
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intellectualized their engagements with ‘the world’ to the point that they have given up any 
claim to the role of spiritual preceptor in our time.”40 
These images of an unmoored and disorientated humanitarianism, now more popularly 
associated more with the state, international law, and the use of military force than with the 
provision of aid to the suffering, are easy enough to recognise and critique. But this then 
leads to the question: what to do about it? It remains a reality that the ways in which 
humanitarian actors engage in the political realm are complex and contested. Pressures from 
interventionist states and local military actors in crisis zones and the need to attract and 
maintain funding from small and large donors all contribute to pressures that make consistent 
adherence to the humanitarian principles extremely challenging. Yet, as Bruno Pommier puts 
it in his analysis of the conflation of humanitarian aid and military intervention: 
 
the main risk for the traditional humanitarian worker is having his or her perception 
blurred by the confusion of interests, objectives, and mandates of a plurality of actors, 
putting access or safety in jeopardy… the term “humanitarian” [should be reserved] for a 
strictly humanitarian action, namely one which is impartial, neutral, and independent.41 
 
Yet care needs to be taken in how the reinforcement of the traditional principles is undertaken 
in order to ensure that any return to the charitable traditions of humanitarianism avoids a 
recurrent slide back into militarisation. It is here, I will argue, that a carefully constructed 
pacifist ethos should be explicitly added to humanitarian principles and values to act as a 
bulwark against usurpation by the state without reducing this to a choice between acting in a 
political or apolitical manner.  
                                                 
40 Woolfolk, op cit, p. 249.  
41 Bruno Pommier, “The Use of Force to Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of 




Humanitarianism and the Pacifist Ethos  
David Rieff, whilst asserting that he himself is not a pacifist, argues that “to imagine that war 
and humanitarian action go together in wartime is a fantasy” and that “arguing for military 
intervention on humanitarian grounds… will always be a contradiction in terms. It is a 
perversion of humanitarianism, which is neutral or it is nothing.”42 Fiona Terry, likewise, 
concludes her influential book on the paradoxes of humanitarian action with the statement 
that: 
‘humanitarian war’ is an oxymoron: it contradicts the fundamental rationale of 
humanitarian action to countenance killing in its name. Humanitarian action aims to 
minimize the harm caused by war; a humanitarian rationale cannot be invoked to justify 
the killing of one set of people to save another.43 
If this is indeed the case, on both deontological and consequential grounds, then the 
possibility presents itself that the only way to protect humanitarian values and the 
organisations that promote and maintain them is to make a definitive shift toward the 
embrace of a pacifist ethos. For if humanitarianism and political violence are necessarily at 
odds, why not draw specific attention to this in the humanitarian principles?  
The adoption of a pacifist ethos by humanitarian organisations would hardly be radical, as the 
desire for a universal peace stood at the very heart of the original aims of the founders of the 
ICRC, and is reflected in the reference to the promotion of “lasting peace amongst all 
peoples” in the principle of “Humanity” contained in the Proclamation. As Jean Pictet points 
out in his classic commentary on the principles, “action for peace flowed quite naturally from 
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the principle of humanity with its command to prevent human suffering.”44 Moreover: 
 
The founders of the Red Cross, Henry Dunant in particular, considered at the very 
beginning that the ultimate objective of the work they set in motion and the Convention 
they inspired was none other than that of universal peace. They understood the fact that 
the Red Cross, by pressing its ideal to its logical outcome, would be working for its own 
abolition, that a day would come when, men having finally accepted and put into effect 
its message of humanity by laying down and destroying their arms and thus making a 
future war impossible, the Red Cross would no longer have any reason for being. This is 
the meaning of the motto, Per humanitatem ad pacem which stands before the 
Constitution of the League of Red Cross Societies, along with the traditional slogan, 
Inter arma caritas.45 
Pictet recognises that “[t]he means available to the Red Cross to eliminate war are limited”, 
but – echoing the tragic sentiment outlined above – goes on to argue that “in the general 
framework of [the] effort for peace, the Red Cross nonetheless constitutes an important moral 
element. It is the symbol of peace, present in the midst of combat. Every one of its acts thus 
becomes a pacifying gesture.”46 More recently, the International Federation of the Red Cross 
included the promotion of “a culture of non-violence and peace” as a strategic aim in its 
“Strategy 2020” document, again signalling the place of non-violence in relation to the 
commitment to the humanitarian principles.47  
The historical embrace of pacifism by humanitarian organisations must, however, be 
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tempered if they are to avoid the inevitable criticisms for failing to achieve the promised 
pacifying effects of their actions. The use of the term “ethos” in this context is deliberate, 
indicating that pacifism is to be understood as a disposition, orientation or principle toward 
which humanitarian organisations might aspire without any expectation that it can be fully 
achieved or solved in practice.48 In other words, an ethos is understood here as an ethical 
commitment that contains within it an appreciation of the tragic, with the aim of avoiding 
“the sanctimonious tendency to treat political action as a moral crusade.”49 The intention is, 
therefore, to identify a principle of consistent non-violent action and opposition to war in 
general on the part of humanitarian groups without elevating that to a belief that the full and 
final pacification of the world can be achieved. Thus, the suggestion I want to advance here is 
that humanitarian organisations can and should resist the urge to practically and discursively 
support the violent politics of the state, regardless of the way in which that violence is 
presented and legitimated publicly. In order to achieve this, humanitarian organisations 
should affirm their commitment to pacifist values through the cultivation of a pacifist ethos 
that is capable of withstanding accusations of naïve apolitical humanitarianism. This should 
not be seen as making a choice between politically-engaged, human rights promoting 
humanitarianism and politically neutral, impartial, non-violent humanitarianism. Rather, a 
pacifist ethos can stand for a consistent opposition to war (and other violent expressions of 
political conflict) without sacrificing political engagement; a humanitarianism that is attuned 
to and engaged with the potential violence of politics whilst permanently disavowing the 
humanitarian utility of the military power of the state.  
Such a pacifist ethos could support the work of humanitarian organisations in a variety of 
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ways. First, it would reassert a genuine commitment to the principles of humanity, neutrality, 
and independence and emphasise the critical link between humanitarianism and non-violence. 
This would also reinforce the distance between the militarised humanitarianism associated 
with the concepts of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, giving voice 
to the contradictory nature of humanitarianism and war pointed out by Rieff, Terry and 
others. Second, on the practical level, it would provide a point of reference against which 
organisations could assess the extent to which their work may be doing more harm than good 
in certain situations through contributing to the maintenance of a local war economy. If there 
are concerns about neutrality in principle leading to complicity in practice, the commitment 
to a pacifist ethos could offer humanitarian agencies a clear additional line of reasoning for 
not entering or departing from “tainted” situations in which they are likely to contribute to 
rather than ameliorate the violence. 
A pacifist ethos would not, on the other hand, mean that all members of humanitarian 
societies must themselves be pacifists. A pacifist ethos, from this point of view, orients the 
action of humanitarian institutions without insisting that every member adopts an absolute 
commitment to pacifism themselves. Even this, however, runs up against an institutional 
vision of neutrality as requiring no stance either way on the legitimacy of war in general. 
Rony Brauman and Pierre Salignon, writing on the humanitarian issues surrounding the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, make it very clear that MSF considered itself to be “neither pro-war nor 
anti-war” as “for humanitarian actors, such considerations are, or should be, immaterial.”50 I 
argue that this position is untenable for precisely the reasons outlined above: humanitarianism 
cannot be reconciled with war on deontological or consequential grounds and must, as such, 
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represent an at least implict anti-war position in order to maintain coherence. Whether or not 
the membership of a particular humanitarian organisation are all pacifists is therefore beside 
the point; the humanitarian institution must embody a coherent set of values, including 
pacifism, in order to sustain its own basic principles. Thus, in keeping with Kimberley 
Hutchings’ recent case in favour of a ‘dirty’ ethico-political pacifism, the pacifist ethos 
“elevates the pursuit of collective and institutional change over the purity of individual 
conscience… it is a plea for a return to absolute pacifism, but to absolute pacifism 
understood, as ‘political’ rather than ‘personal’.”51 
The practical substance of that ‘political’ pacifism then requires some elaboration, 
particularly as many people may view a political humanitarianism as being one which must 
speak out against parties committing atrocity crimes in crisis situations. The ICRC in 
particular has faced sustained criticism over many decades regarding the refusal to speak out 
about the concentration camps in Nazi Germany and about the alleged genocide in the 
Biafran War in the late 1960s.52 In the case of the concentration camps, some have argued 
that the Red Cross should have spoken out publicly and that the failure to do so was a 
dereliction of moral duty.53 Others have offered more circumspect appraisals acknowledging 
the limits faced by the organisation at that time.54 Likewise in the Biafran case, there is the 
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now “mythological” claim that MSF was born out of frustration at the refusal of the Red 
Cross to speak out against the alleged genocidal activities of the Nigerian military.55  
How does the adoption of a pacifist ethos as a humanitarian principle alter this question of 
silence versus public political engagement? The short answer is that it does not and cannot 
provide an answer to this problem. What a pacifist ethos can provide is one more measure for 
thinking through the complex array of issues and circumstances that define humanitarian 
action in any emergency situation. A politically engaged pacifism, in other words, does not 
automatically require that all perpetrators of atrocities should be publicly denounced by 
humanitarian organisations. The demand of peaceful engagement is in fact more likely to 
reinforce the case for staying silent in cases where public denunciation might feed into a 
narrative favouring an interventionist war. Staying silent and continuing to provide aid to 
victims, in such cases, constitutes real political engagement, even if it doesn’t produce an 
immediate solution to the crisis faced. Silent provision of aid to victims represents a political 
stance insofar as all such work and the pacifist ethos underpinning it, is “a pacifying 
gesture.”56 The fact that MSF has itself moved away from overt political advocacy and now 
associates more closely with the Dunantist position on neutrality and silence favoured by the 
ICRC simply highlights this point, particularly as it was the growing militarization of 
humanitarianism in the 1990s and early 2000s that prompted this shift in direction.57   
This approach, driven by the absolute priority afforded to victims of war and the concomitant 
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need to maintain access to the suffering through adherence to the principle of political 
neutrality, would be reinforced, rather than undermined, by the adoption of a pacifist ethos. 
The purpose is not, in other words, to condemn specific actors engaging in specific wars, but 
to orient and guide the action of the organisations as a whole whilst allowing them to 
undertake their work in fraught political situations. The very existence and work of such 
humanitarian organisations in itself speaks of a sensibility that rejects the brutal politics of 
war, so bringing that principle to the fore in the form of a pacifist ethos could serve to 
reinforce the existing principles rather than contradicting or undermining them. 
That this position cannot provide a concrete solution to the tenuous spaces occupied by 
humanitarian organisations should not be a cause for frustration or for conceding too much to 
the militarized human rights agenda. A return to the critique advanced by Rieff in A Bed for 
the Night provides an important anchor here, insofar as it identifies themes of tragedy and 
necessity, most commonly associated with Realist thought in international relations, as being 
a fundamental element of the humanitarian enterprise. Humanitarianism is, from this 
perspective, “by definition an emblem of failure, not success”,58 as its very raison d’etre is 
prompted by the persistence of violent crisis. 
Rieff goes even further than this, refuting the accusations of naivety and utopianism levelled 
against traditional humanitarian actors and turning them back against the proponents of 
humanitarian interventionism. In focusing on the possibility of “solving” the problems of war 
and suffering once and for all, militarised humanitarianism represents a “brand of 
utopianism” that: 
consistently portrays the world as any decent person wishes it were — a world 
increasingly ruled by a humanist consensus and one in which the revolution of moral 
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concern is increasingly the dominant moral and ideological current — rather than as it is. 
This is utopianism not as an expression of decency, but as wish-fulfilment…it is this, and 
not the reservations of humanitarian absolutists who hew to strict neutrality and the ideal 
at least of preserving an autonomous humanitarian space, that is the real retreat into 
wishful thinking.59 
The comment from the former head of the UNHCR, Sadako Ogata, that “there are no 
humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems”60 should not, therefore, be taken as a 
challenge to be overcome or a problem to be solved, but rather as a statement of a tragic 
reality that genuine humanitarians must live and work with. Acceptance of this tragic 
condition becomes the necessary foundation for recognising that “[t]here is nothing small or 
insufficient about what [humanitarian aid workers] do, except, that is, in the tragic human 
sense that all effort is insufficient, all glory transient, all solutions inadequate to the 
challenge, all aid insufficient to the need.” Thus, as Rieff concludes, “[t]he tragedy of 
humanitarianism may be that for all its failings and all the limitations of its viewpoint, it 
represents what is decent in an indecent world.”61 
In assessing this perspective, Woolfolk suggests that “Rieff has begun to articulate a 
humanitarian ethic of resistance”, premised upon “the defense of a humanitarianism that 
knows and respects the tragic limits of this impossible yet necessary enterprise.”62 The 
“resistance” of such a position lies in its acknowledgement of the tragic nature of politics and 
its refusal to countenance the use of force as a solution to the recurrence of that violence. A 
humanitarian pacifist ethos, in this way, steps back from an absolute, theologically-grounded, 
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teleological expectation of the final pacification of the world, yet remains committed to 
resistance to that violence through its very existence and activity. In this sense, it is by no 
means apolitical or amoral, but it necessarily remains neutral and independent with regard to 
the violent competition between states or other armed groups. Indeed, this neutrality and the 
associated commitment to non-violence constitutes the very substance of its politics. To again 
use Woolfolk’s summation of Rieff, the integrity of humanitarian action can only be retained 
if it maintains “a certain spirit of resistance towards the horrible realities of the world, 
anchored by a characterological discipline that rejects resignation and despair.”63 
Effective humanitarian action requires, from this point of view, the capacity to recognise the 
political and historical dynamics of conflict and to understand the limits of what 
humanitarianism can achieve within such situations.64 The “purist” understanding of 
humanitarianism, exemplified by the expectation that the full realisation of humanitarianism 
will ultimately lead to perpetual peace, is necessarily tempered, but not at the expense of 
collaborating with the violence of the state. This accords with Rieff’s “assumption that 
contemporary humanitarians can only exercise charitable virtues responsibly… by learning 
how to think and make judgments, first of all, about the politics and history in which they are 
inextricably enmeshed.”65 Recognition of the politics, history and contingency of violent 
conflicts points toward a recognition of limits, tempering the expectation of ultimate 
redemption normally associated with absolute pacifism. This should not by any means lead to 
a sense of frustration or cynicism, as the persistence of humanitarian efforts geared toward a 
(perhaps unreachable) pacifist horizon could still represent a powerful force for the reiteration 
of non-violent politics and an example of another politics that continues to act out of 
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deference to humanity, regardless of political commitments or preferences.  
Conclusion 
A pacifist sensibility has quite rightly taken its place in the history of humanitarian action, but 
has largely taken an implicit rather than explicit place in the development of the humanitarian 
principles over the years since the ICRC was founded. This hesitancy around the embrace of 
pacifism can perhaps be connected to the brutal, dispiriting, and challenging occurrence of 
genocide over that period as well as to the recurrent questions regarding the role of the Red 
Cross in Nazi Germany, but it is also related to the post-Cold War expectations and ambitions 
of those pushing the human rights agenda, as outlined above. Alongside the conflation of 
human rights and humanitarianism and the association of state power with humanitarian 
values came the associated idea that humanitarian impartiality, neutrality, and independence 
– and the pacifist sentiment that underlies it – is a naïve, utopian, and self-defeating approach 
to righting the wrongs of the world. Arguments rejecting the charitable traditions of 
humanitarianism and calling for a systemic approach incorporating development and state 
power in order to solve the problem of human suffering continue to abound. What I have 
argued here, in defending and buttressing the traditional or Dunantist principles of 
humanitarian aid, is that solution-oriented approaches are not only doomed to fail as a 
consequence of their lack of appreciation of the tragic nature of international politics, but 
they are also likely to undermine the practical and normative value represented by traditional 
humanitarianism. 
In the words of Philippe Gaillard, a man who was deeply traumatised by his experiences as a 
Red Cross leader in Rwanda in 1994, humanitarian aid provision has the modest aspiration 
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“to bring a measure of humanity, always insufficient, into situations that should not exist.”66 
The “always insufficient” element of this statement needs to be understood not as a cry for 
something more, but as a recognition of the good that can be done even when a total solution 
is unavailable. As Rieff”s epigrammatic quote from Bertolt Brecht more poetically puts it:  
 
It won’t change the world,  
It won’t improve relations among men  
It will not shorten the age of exploitation  
But a few men have a bed for the night  
For a night the wind is kept from them  
The snow meant for them falls on the roadway.67 
There is nothing particularly “pure”, “absolute” or “holier-than-thou” about this approach to 
humanitarianism. Rather, in rhetorically and performatively working against the symptoms of 
a militarized world, a humanitarianism founded upon the traditional principles and buttressed 
by a pacifist ethos can engage in the “dirty” politics of representing and enacting the 
possibility of a world not riven by the violently divisive politics of the state. As Kimberley 
Hutchings  argues, this version of pacifism may be founded upon “a conviction that what we 
are ethically and politically is necessarily related to what we do, and what we do needs to be 
described in terms of the practices, beliefs, intended and unintended actual effects involved in 
our acts rather than the (purported) ends served.”68 The provision of humanitarian aid in its 
traditional mode is, from this perspective, ideally suited to the promotion of a pacifist ethos 
that aims toward achieving a less violent world. To return once more to Pictet’s words on 
this, “[e]very one of its acts… becomes a pacifying gesture.”69 
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What is first required, then, is a recognition that the influence of liberal human rights 
activism in conjunction with state power post-Cold War bred a form of humanitarianism that 
was far too heavily focused on ends, born of a “desire to spread development, democracy, 
and human rights, and to join a peace-building agenda that aspires to create stable, effective, 
and legitimate states.”70 Moreover, “as they become increasingly implicated in governance 
structures, they find themselves in growing collaboration with those whom they once 
resisted.”71 Thus, the coordination between states and humanitarian NGOs in seeking to fulfil 
this agenda necessarily pulled those NGOs into providing material and rhetorical support to 
the “war system.” It is only through an absolute rejection of that system and the embrace of a 
pacifist ethos that humanitarianism can escape those clutches, rebuild its centre of “specific 
moral gravity”, and practically and politically represent an opposition to that war system 
while continuing to impartially and independently treat its worst symptoms.  
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